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On the outbreak of the Second World War, Norway’s merchant marine 
was the fourth largest in the world with its gross register tonnage of 4,8 
million. It played substantial role in the state economy as it generated 
more than one third of the national income in the balance of payments. 
Yet, the conflict put the Norwegian sea transport in a difficult situation 
as it dependent on the two warring nations, i.e. Great Britain and Hitler’s 
Third Reich. To make matters worse, any case of tipping the balance by 
the Norwegian fleet in a favour of any of the two belligerents might lead 
to the suspicion that Norway had departed from the policy of neutrality. 
Aware of its perplexing situation, the Norwegian government issued the 
Provisional decree on the regulation of the conditions of charter 
during the war, which effectively strengthened its control of the 
national merchant marine, thus laying sound foundation for a 
tonnage agreement with Great Britain which was eventually signed 
on November 1939. On the strength of this agreement, Norway 
placed 150 tankers at the disposal of the allies and paved the way for 
further agreements of this kind.  
In order to defeat Great Britain during the Second 
World War, the Third Reich had to cross British communication lines, in 
which endeavor the main role was played by the Kriegsmarine, especially its 
U-boats. In this respect the geographical position of the various parts of the 
British Empire played a significant role because being located on continents 
separated by oceans necessitated the use of maritime communication. In 
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London, however, there was no doubt that the British merchant fleet would 
sooner or later be insufficient, resulting in supply shortages and, consequently, 
the economic crisis of the country. Therefore, almost immediately people 
started to look greedily at Norway, small, neutral but with huge sea freight.  
In the summer of 1939 the Norwegian merchant fleet had 4 833 813 BRT1 
of tonnage and was classified in fourth place in the world, just after Britain, 
the United States and Japan (Steen 1959:111). From all the tonnage of Norway 
260 (Skodvin 1990:26) units (of 2 000 000 BRT) (Christensen 1961:415) 
comprised tankers, useful in the war, most of which were modern and well 
equipped; as many as 65% of them were not even 10 years (Skodvin 1990:26) 
old before the outbreak of the war. Let’s just note, for the comparison, that the 
modern and new ships of Great Britain and the USA respectively amounted to 
22.8 % and 7.7 % of their merchant fleet (Lindbæk 1943:10). Diesel engines 
fueled a third of the Norwegian sea freight (Skodvin 1990:26).  
Effective control over the Norwegian merchant fleet was held by the 
Norwegian Shipowners Association (Norges Rederforbund – NRF) which, 
maintaining its influence in all the shipping organizations of Norway, also 
played an important political role. The particular significance of the position of 
the association could be seen especially in foreign contacts, when the 
Norwegian government was repeatedly turning to it for help. For instance, in 
1917 NRF had signed, on behalf of the government, a tonnage contract with 
Great Britain. In 1939 the situation was similar – not wanting to violate the 
neutrality status the mediation of NRF was recognized as necessary (Ørvik 
1953:68).  
As regards the Norwegian state authorities, their main task was meeting 
all the needs which supported the existence of their country. Therefore, Trygve 
Lie – Minister of Commerce, and from 1 October 1939 Minister of Transport – 
saw to it that the most essential business transactions were entered into. The 
Head of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartamentet – 
UD) – Halvdan Koht – in turn, took care of keeping control over the domestic 
vessels (Koht 1957:74). All the same, one of the overriding goals of 
Norwegian politicians was undoubtedly the maintenance of the status of 
Norway’s neutrality (the Norwegian government announced neutrality on 1 
September 1939), especially since the acting of the Norwegian merchant fleet 
in favor of either of the warring parties could be interpreted by the belligerents 
in different ways. The attitude of the principal proponent of the doctrine of 
neutrality was in this matter unequivocal and exactly the same as in the case of 
the First World War. According to this view, the realization of neutrality status 
set the only right way which guaranteed that the most important needs of 
Norwegians would be met (Koht 1957:73; Thowsen 1985a:52). “The general 
  
1
 BRT (Brutto Register Tonne) it is a measure of vessel capacity counted in register 
tonnes. 1 registered tonne = 100 cubic feet = 2,83 m3. 
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policy of relieving tension” (almenn avspennigspolitiken), as H. Koht called it, 
was to be beneficial to small countries while its actual creators comprised only 
world powers (Piotrowski 1992:126).  
Unfortunately, due to the fact that the Norwegian country was conditioned 
by the supply from abroad and particularly from Great Britain and from the 
Third Reich, hanging on to the doctrine of neutrality was feasible only to a 
certain extent. In 1938 imports from the two superpowers respectively 
amounted to 193.9 and 121.5 million crowns (Skodvin 1977:140). In spite of 
the fact that the balance of trade relations with both countries was very similar, 
Norway had to give preference to Great Britain in terms of making any 
decisions. This country had sea ports virtually across the globe, through which 
it was able to stop Norwegian vessels dependent on fuel and maintenance. In 
addition, it was London, not Berlin, which could without problems reduce to a 
minimum the Norwegian supply of grain, oil, coal, coke, all kinds of fats or 
interfere with the Norwegians in the catches of whales in the area of the 
Antarctic (Skodvin 1977:139-140).  
The outlined situation made it possible to include the substantial tonnage 
of the Norwegian merchant fleet to the service of the Allies and to interfere 
with the navigating of vessels which operated for the benefit of the enemy 
(Koht 1957:79). This chance seemed to the vessels more likely because as well 
as from their learned experience from the First World War the Norwegians 
also now wanted to use their sea freight in the lucrative maritime transport. 
Note that the newly-formed British Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) 
(Thowsen 1992:48) was entrusted with solving the problem of co-operation 
between London and the Norwegian shipowners.  
Starting from September 3, the British government strongly demanded the 
use of the Norwegian tonnage and especially the use of the fleet of tankers. 
Similarly, demands were submitted by single neutral countries and – what is 
worth noticing – in the case of using this option the Norwegians would suffer 
fewer losses (Scharffenberg 1950:28; Koht 1957:79). Ingolf Hysing Olsen 
(being both the representative of NRF in London and a shipowner from 
Bergen) was informed of the fact that the situation of Great Britain was stable 
as long as the cooperation with the fleets of neutral countries, and particularly 
with that of Norway, went smoothly. However, just after the outbreak of the 
war, the Norwegian ships (with such important goods as diesel oil, timber and 
iron ore needed for being at war) refused to dock at British ports. Instead, they 
preferred to cooperate with neutral ports. The British felt cheated by this and 
cooperating with the Norwegian ships, especially tankers, became their idée 
fixe (Thowsen 1992:48).  
On September 5, pressured by the British, I. Hysing Olsen reached an 
agreement with the British cell of the Ministry of Economic Warfare – The 
Neutral Tonnage Policy Committee – on the clarification of the Norwegian 
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ships in British ports. The most important issue was also raised, which was 
signing a trade agreement. The British party, touching on the weak point of the 
Norwegians, at first took care not to damage or even destroy their mutual 
relations through Britain’s taking some measures. During the negotiations the 
Norwegian diplomat announced that his government would probably like to 
use its own sea freight, which cast doubt on the signing of any agreement. 
Possibly – as he said – Norwegian tonnage could function under the flag of the 
Allies but on condition that it would be managed by the Norwegians. In return, 
the agreement would take into account the supply of coal, food, etc., beneficial 
to the Norwegians (Thowsen 1992:50; Nilsen and Thowsen 1990:21).  
The loss of London prompted the Foreign Office to commission the 
British diplomat in Oslo Sir Cecil Dormer on September 5 to establish contact 
with the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs – H. Koht. The purpose of the 
planned talks concerned the signing of the agreement on trade and the 
Norwegian sea freight. At that time the British had been meaning to exert 
pressure on their interlocutor, thanks to which the agreement so desired by 
them could be reached as soon as possible. On the other hand, there was 
awareness that the war would bring more difficulties and delay rather than a 
fast finalization in the form of signing such an agreement. This aspect found 
its own reflection in the instructions presented by Sir C. Dormer to H. Koht. 
Learning about the demands of the English project in terms of taking control 
over the maritime trade of Norway, H. Koht expressed his great and 
unpleasant surprise. The British diplomat also familiarized his interlocutor 
with a proposal of signing a trade agreement which would guarantee supplies 
needed by the Norwegians but on condition that the contacts between Norway 
and the Third Reich2 were limited and strictly monitored. The visit of Sir C. 
Dormer3 provoked immediate reactions to the British plan suggesting to Oslo 
  
2
 A prominent role in London’s maritime policy toward Norway was played by the British 
military authorities. On 4 September the Chief Committee of Staff presented its opinion on the 
involvement of Norway in the blockage of the Third Reich and at the same time indicated the 
consequences of taking this action. It also claimed that the allies are able to exert a strong war-
time economic pressure on Norway if Her Majesty’s government allows fully (Konecki 
2003:21).  
3
 It is worth noticing that the day before the visit of Sir C. Dormer to Norwegian Prime 
Minister Johan Nygaardsvold and Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Koht, with a mission similar to 
the British diplomat, there was a representative of the German government – Ulrich von Hassel. 
The German made it clear that his country wanted to maintain the existing economic ties with 
Norway. In addition, the Third Reich agreed to the trade which would question the neutrality of 
Norway if only the Norwegians agreed to its control on the rules that were applied toward 
Sweden during the First World War by Great Britain and France. The Norwegians, of course, 
refused (Thowsen 1992:51).  
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that London aimed to take full control over the Norwegian trade violating in 
this way Norwegian neutrality4 (Thowsen 1992:51; Koht 1957:77).  
In spite of that the idea was constantly evolving among Norwegian 
politicians that signing a trade agreement with London was a necessity. In 
order to be prepared for such a circumstance both the government of Norway 
and the Norwegian Shipowners Association were continuously creating the 
appropriate and lawful conditions. Actions taken by the state authorities of 
Norway resulted in publishing on 5 September 1939 the Provisional decree on 
the regulation of the conditions of charter during the war (Ørvik 1953:76-77).  
The conditions of this document, amounting to 13 paragraphs, were 
immediately implemented. Thanks to this document the Norwegian Ministry 
of Trade obtained the right to prohibit the mooring of vessels in the Norwegian 
Kingdom. This ban could be limited to particular types of ships or individual 
units. Moreover, this ministry was authorized to break and renew tonnage 
contracts, prohibit the loading of Norwegian vessels (even when loading had 
already begun) and make decisions concerning the payment of the maximum 
rate for the Norwegian ships transporting goods from foreign ports to Norway. 
Preparation of the project for determining rates was handed over to a 
committee appointed for this purpose, whose members were chosen by the 
Ministry of Commerce (in the Provisorisk anordning om regulering av 
befraktningsforhold i krigstid – henceforth PA).  
The completed tonnage agreements being inconsistent with the regulations 
included in the presented decree were considered invalid. Those who broke the 
law were to be fined up to 100 000 crowns, the penalty of six months in prison 
or both penalties at the same time. Decisions established by decree could be 
cancelled by the Ministry of Commerce at the time when he considered it 
appropriate (PA).  
According to Kaare Petersen this decree ensured delivery of all the 
necessary goods for Norway (Petersen 1955:116). However, equal significance 
should be attributed to giving to the Norwegian state authorities the possibility 
of managing the domestic trade fleet and creating the basis for signing a 
tonnage agreement with London in the future.  
Taking the domestic trade fleet under the wings of the state authorities of 
Norway did not deprive them of the fear of the fleet being taken over by the 
British (Thowsen 1992:52). According to some shipping activists the above 
concern confirmed the circulating rumors (Nilsen and Thowsen 1990:22). This 
fear also resulted from the fact that London did not want a large number of 
ships sinking on fairways surrounding the British Isles or crossing the Atlantic 
to deter both sailors and shipowners themselves. Having decided on a 
thorough examination of the level of the royalties, London wanted to 
  
4
 The British made similar demands toward Denmark and Sweden; however, also these 
countries sent on 12 September negative answers to London (Koht 1957:77).  
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encourage neutral ships to moor in British ports (Thowsen 1985b:13) by 
considering proposals to increase rates.  
Mid September 1939 was the last moment for Oslo to come to a decision 
about entering into a tonnage contract with the British. It was debated whether 
to surrender and sign an agreement with London or do as the Danish 
government did and refuse to accept the British conditions of supply of coal. 
The Norwegian Shipowners Association and the state authorities wanted to use 
their greatest national treasure but the agreement concerning the trade fleet 
could have violated the neutrality so praised by the Norwegians (Thowsen 
1992:54; Nilsen and Thowsen 1990:22-23). One should also agree with the 
attitude of H. Koht, who constantly insisted that such an agreement would be 
interpreted in various ways by the warring parties (Koht 1957:78).  
Despite the encountered difficulties on 21 September 1939 the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Norway demanded that the Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Association appoint members to participate in a specially created committee. 
This was to be established with a view to appointing representatives who 
would sign a tonnage contract in London. It was also pointed out that it could 
not violate the neutral status of Norway (Thowsen 1992:54; Nilsen and 
Thowsen 1990:23; Egeland 1968:44) to which the very next day the United 
Kingdom committed to obey, on condition that it was not violated by the Third 
Reich (Scharffenberg 1950:25). The government order was not any surprise to 
members of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association who knew about the 
ongoing preparations for the appointing of a delegation (Ørvik 1953:87).  
The Norwegian Shipowners Association soon chose its representatives 
with I. Hysing Olsen and shipowner Frank Odfjell as members of that 
association and Andreas Urby as chairman of the delegation. All three 
diplomats went to the capital of England on 25 September and the instructions 
that they were given should be identified as preliminary (Thowsen 1992:54; 
Nilsen and Thowsen 1990:23; Egeland 1968:44; Koht 1957:82-83).  
At the beginning of October 1939 it became clear that establishing an 
agreement would be delayed. The cause of failure of the negotiations was 
rooted to some extent in the fact that the mission of A. Urby did not have the 
sufficient power of attorney, which did not suit the British side. Moreover, the 
British government instructed its negotiators to take a rigid stand against the 
Norwegians in the issue concerning the tonnage of tankers and to avoid any 
blackmail. The overall situation of the talks worsened the attitude of those 
British who did not want to hear about the trade agreement if an agreement on 
maritime freight was not signed. Although the Norwegian delegation did not 
achieve significant results, the conducted negotiations brought some clearer 
insight into each other’s expectations. The Norwegians wanted the supply of 
bunker coal which would satisfy both ship owners and crew as well as a 
guarantee of payment for the tonnage which could be paid in appropriate 
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proportions. In addition, there were demands to fulfill their other supply needs 
and maintain the same contacts with Germans when it came to shipping as it 
was before the war. However, the British wanted the Norwegian government 
or the Norwegian Shipowners Association (on behalf of the Norwegian 
shipowners) to enter into a binding charter contract, the pricing rules of which 
would depend on the market. However, the Norwegian Shipowners 
Association did not have any power of attorney by which it could compel its 
members to hire ships and the Norwegian government was not prepared at that 
time to persuade the ship owners to accept such a charter agreement. In the 
conducted negotiations the Norwegians stressed that sailing their ships to the 
United Kingdom had not been banned and F. Odfjell said that none of the 
shipowners refused to sail to the British Isles. The decisive factors in these 
negotiations turned out to be those which related to the rates and conditions of 
the signing of the contract. The Norwegians, because of a better price offer 
than that of the British, were discouraged from continuing further dialogue 
(Thowsen 1992:54-55).  
Following the failure of talks with the British, which ended shortly after 
London had presented their demands as an ultimatum (Egeland 1968:44), one 
of the representatives of the Norwegian Shipowners Association was asked to 
consult the Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs H. Koht and T. Lie. The key point of the talks concerned the analysis 
of the list of requirements brought by the delegation of A. Urby. According to 
this, the British demanded the tonnage of fleet which Norway did not need for 
its own use and they also demanded the provision of 150 large tankers, which 
constituted nearly two thirds of Norwegian vessels of this type (Egeland 
1968:44; Thowsen 1992:55-56; Nilsen and Thowsen 1990:23). In addition, 
London was not willing to pay the rates higher than 8 shillings per ton 
(Egeland 1968:44).  
On 3 October the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed by 
telegraph about the aforementioned demands of London. On the same day a 
representative of shipowners came up with a statement summoning a 
conference in order to study carefully the received report (Egeland 1968:45; 
Ørvik 1953:99). As regards the forthcoming negotiations between the 
government and the Norwegian Shipowners Association, the Norwegian 
authorities also now saw to it that future decisions would not hinder the policy 
of neutrality. What is more, J. Nygaardsvold made it clear that entering into 
any contract with Britain would adversely affect relations with the Third 
Reich, which would not respect the current status of Norway. As far as the 
British were concerned, they were almost certain that signing of the contract so 
desired by them was just a matter of time (Thowsen 1992:56; Nilsen and 
Thowsen 1990:23).  
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The most important meeting between the Norwegian government and the 
shipowners took place on 11 October 1939. The first demands were put 
forward by the Central Committee of the Norwegian Shipowners Association, 
which stressed that the interests of the trade fleet were the best-known to 
members of that association. As a result, they should be given full freedom 
when it came to controlling (Ørvik 1953:104-105) that fleet, though without 
binding through collective agreements concerning sea freight. However, such a 
solution meant a shortage of so many supplies needed for Norway (Thowsen 
1992:45; Egeland 1968:45). The Norwegian Shipowners Association, realizing 
that the problem was serious and, what should be noticed, not knowing the 
magnitude of the exerted pressure by the British on the Norwegian authorities, 
finally agreed to help its government in reaching agreement with London 
(Scharffenberg 1950:29).  
The determination of the Norwegian Shipowners Association was met 
with great optimism by the British party, especially that in accordance with 
London’s opinion the Norwegian shipowners intended to negotiate without 
any preparation. A few days before the forthcoming negotiations it was the 
British who thought of the future strategy of the talks. Lord Glenconner, a 
member of MEW, wanted to maintain a rigid position against the Norwegian 
state authorities. He referred to decisions which were reached on 3 October 
1939 by the War Cabinet. These decisions concerned the necessity to use 
pressure against the Norwegian government in order to rent vessels under the 
conditions which would most satisfy London. The Head of the Scandinavian 
Department in the British Ministry of Economic Warfare – Charles Hambro, 
having large experience in contacts with the Norwegian shipowners – 
indicated that there should be  negotiations with groups associated with sea 
freight rather than with the government. That is why he ordered the negotiators 
to wait without taking any drastic measures until the Norwegians took a more 
decisive stance (Thowsen 1992:56).  
The negotiations with the British began in London on 24 October 19395. 
The Scandinavians were represented by a delegation headed by Thomas 
Fearnley and I. Hysing Olsen; Leif Høegh and Klaus Wiese-Hansen were also 
present. John Oskar Egeland was appointed as secretary of this delegation. 
Great Britain had its representatives in the newly formed Ministry of Shipping 
(MS) and MEW (Thowsen 1992:56-57; Egeland 1968:46). The British party 
was led by Sir Cyril Hurcomb (Høegh 1970:26).  
The delegation came with tough demands approved by the Norwegian 
government. The Norwegian Shipowners Association treated talks held by 
itself as a kind of its own economic policy aiming primarily to unite the 
Norwegian shipowners for the duration of the war (Høegh 1970:26).  
  
5
 Atle Thowsen gives the date of 25 October 1939 (Thowsen, 1985b:17).  
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There was a further breakdown in the negotiations. Among the 
Norwegians two groups emerged. One of them was to watch over the matter of 
tankers – here L. Høegh and Odd Gogstad played the key roles – whereas the 
other group was to watch over tramps and cruise liners. The latter was led by 
K. Wiese-Hansen and I. Hysing Olsen. T. Fearnley decided not to participate 
oficially in the talks (Egeland 1968:49).  
Negotiations in London lasted over three weeks but the conditions which 
were to be in force in the future were known earlier when negotiators had 
drawn up the Memorandum of the Norwegian-British contract of tonnage 
agreement on 11 November 1939. The demands of this document will be 
presented later on but now let’s focus on the atmosphere in which the 
agreement was reached.  
The whole negotiations ended when the issue of war insurance was in 
question. The British, wanting to rent the ships, refused to cover the expenses 
for war insurance for that part of sea freight which would not be covered by a 
trade contract. This decision was explained by the fact that the Norwegian war 
insurance for the trade fleet was higher than those which could be obtained on 
the open market. This situation aroused extreme reactions among the 
Norwegian shipowners. Among the British prevailed embarrassment by the 
financial premiums under the war insurance which were to be paid for vessels 
sailing along the English Channel (very important during the war). For these 
reasons, in the draft to the tonnage contract Great Britain proposed its own 
decree thanks to which it could receive the right to control part of the fleet 
under the tonnage contract, to which the Norwegians eventually agreed. It was 
also decided that the premiums on war reparations for the fleet serving in the 
English Channel (Thowsen 1992:57) should be lowered.  
As far as the war is concerned, the Norwegians offered rates twice as high 
as those intended to be paid by the Allies (16 shillings per ton paid every 
month). Such an attitude of the Scandinavians may be surprising since in the 
instructions for the delegation of T. Fearnley there were charges at the rate of 
12 shillings. Apart from this, it was predicted that thanks to the coming 
realization of trade contracts, the losses caused by the difference between the 
offered rates would be compensated within six months (Egeland 1968:49-50).  
Likewise, negotiations on the tramp and cruise liner fleet met with 
resistance. The situation on the market was not conducive to vessels carrying 
dry goods in conditions where the charter offer still outweighed the demand. 
Initially, the Norwegians also demanded for the present freight rates 
amounting to 16 shillings. However, the British party categorically refused, 
pointing to the market price which amounted to 12 shillings (Egeland 
1968:50).  
Finally, under a rule of the reached agreement the Norwegian Shipowners 
Association made it available to the Allies to rent 150 tankers (equivalent to 
Jordan Siemianowski 
 
 
54 
1 500 000 DWT6) including the tankers borrowed temporarily by the British. 
These ships were to be delivered as quickly as possible just after the term of 
expiry of their orders or becoming exempt from operating orders. Keeping in 
mind the supply of units by the Norwegian representatives, about 200 000 
DWT were made available to 31 December 1939, whereas the remaining 
250 000 DWT from 1 January to 29 February 1940. Moreover, oil tankers 
were to be accommodated to transport large quantities of petroleum (in the 
Memorandum of Arrangement between the United Kingdom Ministry of 
Shipping and the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association – henceforth MA).  
As far as possible – under a rule of this agreement – when chartering the 
Norwegian tankers, they were to be hired outside the waters particularly 
exposed to military operations (excluding the East Coast ports of the United 
Kingdom and ports of the English Channel to the east of Southampton and the 
French ports to the east of Le Havre). The scope of that exclusion was to be 
revised within six months (MA).  
In addition, the Ministry of Maritime Transport, on behalf of Her 
Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom, decided not to apply any 
restrictions or dictations to the Norwegian ships. The British units would be 
obliged to obey these restrictions, taking into account the terms of tanking, dry 
docking, acquisition of equipment and supply, sending new spare parts in the 
ports of the United Kingdom or British colonies, protectorates, territorial 
mandates or state protectorates. Care was taken to ensure that the Norwegian 
shipowners received the same contracts as the British shipowners, taking into 
account the charges. Finally, it was promised that the Norwegian flag would 
be protected against any discrimination and the Norwegian vessels would be 
used for trade within the British Empire (MA).  
The British representatives insisted that the Norwegian Shipowners 
Association gave to the Allies that part of the Norwegian tramps the temporary 
charters of which would expire in the future. The Norwegians agreed to this 
request but at the same time they announced that as long as this tonnage was 
not fully exploited for the purposes of Norway, they would not reveal the 
complete number of possessed tramps (MA).  
Representatives of the Norwegian Shipowners Association also stated that 
the subsequent ships leaving the charter of 200 000 DWT would be made 
available – by force of this agreement – for the United States to 31 March 
1940. They highlighted the fact that this number could be increased. Delivery 
of the complete estimates was promised within two weeks (MA).  
For units powered by diesel engines of more than 10 000 BRT there were 
rates amounting to 16 shillings per ton paid each month. However, for tankers 
  
6
 DWT (Dead Weight Tonne) – dead-weight tonnage measured as the difference between 
the displacement (weight) of the loaded vessel and the displacement of the empty vessel. 1 
DWT = 1 metric ton = 2240 pounds = approximately 1016 kg.  
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of the same displacement these rates were from 16/2 to 17/6 shillings. 
Steamboats had to content themselves with royalties which were operative in 
the ordinary trade contracts. For these types of units of more than 10 000 BRT 
royalties equaled 14/6 shillings. Tankers of less than 10 000 BRT received 
rates ranging from 14/8 to 16 shillings. There were highly diversified 
conditions of charges when it came to tramps (the provision of 450 000 DWT 
was promised). For those tramps with a displacement of 10 000 BRT they 
amounted to 12/6 shillings, whereas for vessels of 1 500 BRT 24 shillings 
(MA).  
Charter was based on the rate of 17 crowns 60 øre for one pound. If the 
value of the crown were to fall in relation to the British currency, a new 
conversion was to be applied. The shipowners, who hired ships to the British, 
took upon themselves the payment of the premiums associated with the war 
risk. Any allowances connected with this, compensation in the event of death 
or disability could even reach an amount of 10 000 crowns. Despite the 
relatively high rates for charter the Norwegians were disappointed with the 
attitude of the British who failed to fulfill their promise of replacing the 
sunken ships with identical ones. The Norwegian shipowners received only 
assurance that the new vessels would be built in British shipyards in the 
number which corresponded to the number of losses (MA).  
The Agreement of 11 November 1939, also known as the Scheme 
Agreement (Thowsen 1992:59) or Schemeavtalen (Askelund 1964:1), was the 
basis for further agreements of this type between Nortraship7 and the British 
and U.S. authorities (Petersen, 1955:126). It was decided that this agreement 
would be valid for the duration of war. Note that every six months both parties 
called for the revision of the agreed provisions (Thowsen 1992:59).  
From an economic point of view the Norwegian-British tonnage 
agreement of 11 November 1939 favored the shipowners. However, due to 
increased shipping rates the financial income resulting from the reached 
agreement was decreased; as a result the Norwegians complained that they 
subsidized the ‘British war’ (Thowsen 1985a:53-54). The Norwegian marine 
environment experienced benefits as a result of the liabilities of the British. 
London promised not to create a ‘blacklist’ of ships serving the Third Reich 
and not to reduce or interfere with the import of material needed for Norway 
from Germany. Trade between the Third Reich and Norway was guaranteed 
and was to be held on the outgoing conditions (Skodvin 1977:141). The 
biggest advantage coming from the signed agreement did not result from a 
purely economic matter but from the continuity of delivering necessary goods 
for Norway (Høegh 1970:29).  
  
7
 Nortraship (Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission) – it was the largest shipping 
organization during the Second World War founded in April 1940 by the Norwegian activists 
Erik Colban and I. Hysing Olsen.  
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Among the neutral countries with a large trade fleet it was Norway which 
handed over the biggest tonnage of sea freight to the Allies. The United States 
agreed to sell materials to the allies but refused to transport them on their own 
ships. The Netherlands – having tonnage of 3 000 000 BRT – did not sign a 
tonnage agreement with the British, so the Allies benefited from the present 
fleet after 10 May 1940. Denmark (1 100 000 BRT) feared repression from the 
Third Reich, which is why it initially adopted the same attitude as the 
Netherlands. Only the threats of suspension of Danish export of agricultural 
products to Great Britain forced Copenhagen to reach a tonnage agreement 
with London. However, this agreement did not play an important role because 
it was signed on 2 April 1940 – one week before German aggression on 
Denmark (Thowsen 1992:88-93).  
Greece, having a tonnage of 1 700 000 BRT of which 80% was more than 
20 years old, signed an agreement with the British in February 1940. Apart 
from Norway only Sweden provided a larger and more modern tonnage 
ranging from 260 000 to 330 000BRT to the Allies (Thowsen 1992:93).  
Considering the issue of the Norwegian-British tonnage contract of 11 
November 1939 it should be stated, as Leif Høegh mentioned, that the 
delegation of T. Fearnley had been appointed not by the Norwegian 
Shipowners Association but by the Norwegian government (Høegh 1970:26). 
That is why, after this agreement was reached, the matter of the neutrality of 
Norway raised numerous objections, particularly in Berlin. A few months later 
the Third Reich accused Oslo of breaking with the self-proclaimed status of 
neutrality. H. Koht, defending his homeland, pointed out that it was the 
representatives of the ownership associations who assigned the contract and 
not the Norwegian authorities (also in the documentation of the Norwegian 
research Commission we will find the information that it was the Norwegian 
Shipowners Association that came into close contacts with authorities abroad) 
(Bergsgård 1947:191). Besides, as he said, details were kept in secret but the 
main provisions were announced immediately after the signing of the treaty. In 
addition, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs answered any questions 
raised by a German diplomat in Oslo as regards this agreement. What is more, 
from the beginning of January 1940 the indiscreet French published in one of 
the maritime newspapers the details of the November contract. The strongest 
argument denying German accusations is the fact that no law of neutrality 
imposed the prohibition of hiring ships between the warring parties (Koht 
1941:27, 29).  
In fact, no law of neutrality says that a neutral country is obliged to be 
impartial towards the warring parties. The Hague Convention of 18 October 
1907 included provisions regarding neutrality which applied during the First 
and Second World War. These provisions also assume that martial law cannot 
in any way affect the earnings of citizens of neutral countries. If such people 
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do not act on behalf of the government of their country, neutrality law is not 
thereby violated (Makowski 1918:220). However, people who act in favor of 
one of the belligerents, in this case the Norwegian shipowners entering into a 
contract with the representatives of the British government, could not benefit 
from the privileges of neutrality (Winiarski 1938:114). It follows from this that 
the warfare of Kriegsmarine against the Norwegian trade fleet after 11 October 
1939 was justified by the Hague Convention. However, the Norwegian 
authorities used a loophole in international acts thereby maintaining the status 
of neutrality.  
Apart from measurable financial benefits the considered tonnage contract 
constituted an important element of the foreign policy of Oslo. Among the 
Norwegian state authorities as well as activists associated with the trade fleet 
of Norway this arrangement created a strong belief in the similarity of the 
ongoing conflict when compared with the First World War. Norway had once 
again maintained its independence thanks to the policy of disengagement and 
any tonnage losses were to be met with high royalties obtained from the sea 
freight business. The Norwegian-British agreement highlighted a very 
important aspect – it turned out that in foreign policy, as it was during the 
previous world conflict, Norway strongly preferred contacts with London than, 
for example, with Berlin.  
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